Hempel And In stan tial Confirmation

I
The concept o f a positive instance has been s ig n ific a n tly included in the study of qu alitative confirmation, at le ast since Hempel's controver s ia l and stim ulating work on the topic was published three decades ago. His study made extensive reference to p o sitive instances, and the in fa mous paradoxes of confirmation were f i r s t generated in connection with what is known as "the in sta n tia l criterion of confirmation," which as serts that any universal generalization is confirmed by it s positive in stances. There have been several assessments of Hempel's study which view his work as an attempt to explicate the concept of a positive in stance rather than a concept of confirmation. Israe l Scheffler offered such an interpretation of Hempel's study some years aqo,l and John Pollock has very recently presented a sim ila r interpretation.2 This assessment o f Hempel's study has not been challenged, to my knowledge, and I shall do so here. Before doing so, however, I shall discuss the concept of a positive instance and indicate it s relations to Hempel's study of confi rmati on. I shall not attempt to l i s t a ll the d ifferent senses in which th is expression has been understood and used, but I shall restate the point I wish to make by saying that there is no s ig n ific a n t sense of 'i s confirmatory with respect t o 1 which can be reasonably ide n tifie d with the sense commonly attributed to 'i s a positive instance o f '. In other words, one cannot assume that sentences which are positive instan ces of a hypothesis are ipso facto confirmatory (in any sense) with re spect to that hypothesis. The in sta n tia l crite rio n o f confirmation, said by Hempel to be one o f the most widely asserted rules of induction,4 would be a mere tautology rather than a substantive inductive rule i f the concept o f confirmatory evidence expressed was identical with the con cept of a positive instance. For th is reason i t is disquieting to read John P o llo ck 's statement: "Positive instances are those instances which, upon being amassed, lead to greater and greater confirmation of the hypo thesis. "5 Pollock appears to offer th is as a defin ition of positive instances, and th is suspicion is borne out by the fact that he assumes not only that e^ is confirmatory with respect to h_ i f e_ is an instance of h^ but also that e^ is an instance of h^ i f e^ is confirmatory with respect to h_. The former assumption is not s ta r tlin g since confirmation theo r is t s have often made i t , but the la tte r assumption is . The assumption is contained in a passage in which he purports to reproduce the reasoning which led Hempel to discover the paradox of the ravens.6 Referring to some of Hempel's conditions of adequacy, he establishes that '(-A c & -Be) ' confirms ' (x )(A x Z> B x )', and then erroneously concludes that the former must also be counted as a positive instance o f the la tte r. Hempel, i t may be recalled, e x p lic itly rejected as a necessary condition o f e 's con firming h^ that e^ be an instance of h_,7 and so P o llo ck's restatement of Hempel's argument is incorrect. More serious perhaps, is the fa ilu re to distin guish the concept of an instance from the concepts of confirmation. assent to the epistemic principle that i f e confirms h^ and h 1 is lo g i c a lly equivalent to Ju then e^ confirms h_' Tthat i s , that the confirmation of a hypothesis does not depend upon the form in which i t is expressed), but th is does not require committment to the s u p e rfic ia lly sim ila r prin ciple that i f i_ is an instance of h^ and h/ is lo g ic a lly equivalent to h_, then i_ is an instance of h_'. The lo gical form in which a conditional sentence is expressed seems to be sig n ific a n t in determining whether or not another sentence is a positive instance of that conditional. D e fin i tion ( Table I d 13 This q u a lific a tio n is necessary, Hempel argues in "Studies," p. 14.
According to Hempel's crite rio n , sentences ( i) -( v i i i ) d ire ctly con firm Q, (xvi) disconfirms Q, and (ix ) -(xv) neither disconfirm nor d i rectly confirm Q. I t can be shown that a sentence in
Definition (2) is assumed here. According to definition (3), a sen tence d ire ctly confirms Q i f i t is a positive instance o f Q.
F-3 Although some o f the hypotheses in Table I I are e a sily obtainable by t r ia l and error, there is a general method enabling one to obtain these and other suitable hypotheses. I shall illu s tr a te the method using the e v i dence sentence '-P a 1.
Let H _' be some universal conditional sentence lo g ic a lly equivalent to
H and of which '-P a ' is a positive instance. Since H' is in the form of 
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Scheffler, Anatomy, p. 237.
'e^ confirms h/ to mean 'e^ accords with h^ but not also with the contrary of h_' , or 'e is a positive instance of h^ but not of the contrary of hj , i.e . , '^con firm s (in Hempel's sense) h^ but not the contrary of h^'. Hempel, he contends, trie s to explicate the underlying notion o f a posi tive instance of hypothesis. Now Hempel indeed asserts that the concept of confirmation he is concerned to explicate is clo sely connected with the concept of an instance o f a hypothesis, but he never goes farther than spying that a s u ffic ie n t condition o f a sentence's confirming a given hypothesis is that that sentence is an instance of the hypothesis.
A very l i t t l e reflection w ill reveal the inadequacy of Sc h e ffle r's id e n tific a tio n . In the f i r s t place, i f i_ is a positive instance of h^ then ]i must be a universal conditional sentence, for the class of senten ces which can be construed as having instances are universal conditionals. Hempel, however, clearly allows sentences of any lo g ic a l form whatsoever, not ju st universal conditionals, to serve as hypothesis-sentences. This point would not be v itia te d i f the concept of a positive instance were to be understood so that any general sentence (that is , one containing a non-vacuous quantifier) were judged to have instances, for Hempel allows sentences o f molecular form to be hypothesis-sentences.
In the second place, and more importantly, the lo gical conditions of adequacy which Hempel enunciated as representing important characteristics o f his explicandum can hardly be viewed as characte ristics of the concept o f a positive instance. One important condition which Hempel requires any adequate explication of the concept of confirmation to f u l f i l l is the entailment condition: I f e^ e n tails h^ then e^ confirms h^. I f Scheffler is correct in his interpretation o f Hempel, then Hempel must be construed as requiring that the following conditions be f u lf ille d : I f e^ e n ta ils h^ then e^ is a positive instance of h_. I t is absurd to suggest that such a condition represents an important characteristic o f the concept o f an in stance o f a hypothesis, e .g., i t is absurd to suggest that 1 (>c)(Px) ' is a positive instance o f 'P a '! A consideration of other conditions Ô7 ade quacy yie ld s sim ila r highly objectionable results. I t would be no use for Scheffler to reply that Hempel is offering a rational reconstruction of the concept of a positive instance, and that some in tu itiv e ly acceptable judgements w ill have to be sacrifice d for the sake of generality, comprehensiveness, etc., for such a reply over looks the widely acknowledged requirement that any proposed explicatum must be in s u ffic ie n tly close agreement with the customary meaning of the explicandum. One further example illu s tr a te s the im p la u sib ility of S c h e ffle r's interpretation o f Hempel's explicandum. Hempel allows ' Pa* as confirmatory with respect to ' j V .
Given Sc h e ffle r's interpretation of Hempel's explicandum, ' Pa' would have to be construed as a positive instance o f 'J V . Such examples constitute exactly the kinds o f counter in tu itiv e results which count decisively against S c h e ffle r's id e n ti fic a tio n .
